Drawing on a random sampling, longitudinal data of manufacturing firms and workers we collected ourselves, China Employer-Employee Survey (CEES), this paper provides a complete analyses about differences of productivity and financial returns between state owned enterprises (SOEs) and private firms in China. We find that, the labor productivity and TFP of SOEs are significantly higher than private firms between 2013 and 2015, which is different from existing papers using Annual Survey of Industrial Firms (ASIF) for earlier period, which only include SOEs and private firms with annual sales above 20 million RMB (USD 308,000). Furthermore, this paper finds that, although better human capital, more market power and better management can explain partially why productivity in SOEs are higher, there remains a large share of the SOE advantage in productivity that is still left unexplained. In stark contrast, we find that, financial returns measured in ROA and ROE are significantly lower for SOEs than private firms.
The Performance of State-Owned Enterprise：
New Evidence from the China Employer-Employee Survey
Introduction
Although it is generally believed that state-owned enterprises (Hsieh and Song, 2015) found that SOEs, especially large ones, have labor productivity similar to that of the average private firm. Moreover, Brandt et al. (2017) found that TFP has grown faster for SOEs than other types of firms since 2011. Perhaps the literature is divided because of the limitations of Chinese enterprise data.
As to today, most papers use the Annual Survey of Industrial Firms (ASIF)
conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) for the period 1998-2013, which only include State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and private firms with annual sales above 20 million RMB (USD 308,000).
Drawing on the China Employer-Employee Survey (CEES), a new data we collected ourselves, we examine differences in productivity and financial returns between SOEs and firms under different forms of ownership. CEES, a new longitudinal study of manufacturing firms and workers in China, has several advantages. First, the CEES samples firms of various sizes in China, creating a sample that is more representative of China's manufacturing sector. Second, this survey not only collected information on the financial performance of firms, but also on firm behaviors from variables related to human capital, market power and firm management. Third, although not critical for this paper, CEES collected data at the employee-level in addition to the firm-level.
We find that SOEs have higher labor productivity and TFP than private firms in China, but their financial returns (ROA and ROE) are lower. Specifically, regression results show that the labor productivity for SOEs was USD 128,450 in 2013-2015, about 68% higher than that of private firms (USD 76,306). Although better human capital, more market power and better management can explain partially why SOEs perform better, there remains a large share of the SOE advantage in productivity that cannot be explained by these observables. However, we also find that our measures of financial returns such as ROA and ROE are lower for SOEs than those of private firms.
In addition to the new CEES dataset, our paper makes an additional contribution by providing a more complete analysis of the differences in efficiency and financial returns of SOEs and other firms in China. In this paper, we examine differences between SOEs and other firms in terms of efficiency-as measured by labor productivity and total factor productivity (TFP)-and financial returns-as measured by return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). Generally, existing research has focused on analyses of differences in either TFP or a measure of financial returns (Cai et.al, 2011; Bai et.al, 2009 ).
There are some possible explanations about both high productivity and low financial returns of SOEs. First, the high productivity of SOEs suggests that Chinese private firms may become "worse" in recent years.
Different from exiting paper that found the productivity (and its growth) was significantly lower in SOEs before the year 2007 (Brandt and Zhu, 2010; Brandt et.al, 2012) , with the CEES data, our paper find that both labor productivity and TFP of SOEs are significantly higher than private firms, suggesting that productivity growth of Chinese private firms may become slower in the recent decade.
Second, low credit costs of Chinese SOEs may be an reason resulting in both the high productivity and low financial returns of SOEs (Song et.al, 2011; Brandt, 2016) . Based on credit benefits from banks and other financial institutions controlled by government, SOEs can invest more on advanced production machinery and increase capital-labor ratio, which make their productivity higher than private firms. However, with low credit costs and soft budget constraint, SOEs are more likely to over-invest than private firms, which make their returns to investment significantly lower. With the limit of survey data, our paper can't examine this hypothesis under regression analyses. Therefore, we will add more variables representing credit costs (such as loan, interest rate, and bonds) into CEES to examine this hypothesis in future.
Third, measures representing human capital, market power and management are not able to fully account for differences of productivity and financial returns between SOEs and private firms. In regression analyses, our paper only use proportion of highly-educated workers, market share (export dummy), and management score as proxy variables of human capital, market power and management, which may not sufficiently explain the effects of these three factors in differences between SOEs and private firms. Furthermore, under the data limit, our paper is not able to observe annual changes of ownership type, suggesting that we can't compare the differences of productivity (financial returns) between SOEs and those privatized former SOEs, which can effectively decrease selectivity bias in examining the effects of ownership types on productivity and financial returns. Besides that, regression results in this paper only focus on differences of performance in incumbent firms, which don't account for effects of firms' entry and exit on differences between SOEs and private firms. As low-efficient SOEs have stronger barriers to exit, the difference of performance between SOEs and private firms may be under-estimated in this paper.
The structure of the remainder of this paper is as follows. In section 2, we further explain components of SOE efficiency and present our econometric model. In section 3, we introduce the CEES dataset and report our descriptive results. Section 4 presents our main results on the differences in efficiency between SOEs and other firms. Section 5 explains why SOEs are more productive than private firms. Section 6 examines the differences in financial returns between SOEs and private firms. Section 7 concludes.
Methods

Econometric Specification
To measure the differences between SOEs and firms under other forms of ownership, we estimate the following econometric equation:
The subscripts i, j, d and t represent firm, industry, city and year. The dependent variable, ijdt y , represents one of four performance measures that will be explained later in this section. 
Performance Measures
In our analyses, we use four performance measures: labor productivity, total factor productivity (TFP), returns on assets (ROA) and returns on equity (ROE). Our first measure of performance is labor productivity, which is calculated as sales revenue per worker.
Our second measure of performance is the log of TFP. We obtain residuals from the production function in the Cobb-Douglas functional form as follows:
The dependent variable of equation (2) Our third and fourth outcome measures are returns on assets (ROA) and returns on equity (ROE), which we use to examine the financial returns of firms. These measures are calculated using the ratio of net profit to total assets and the ratio of net profit to equity, respectively.
Survey and Data
In this section, we briefly describe the China Employer-Employee Survey which are collected by the authors. To save space, we have a more detailed description in Appendix A. We also summarize key variables for our empirical analysis.
China Employer-Employee Survey
The Lists of firms from the third National Economic Census, which was conducted in early 2014, were used as the sampling frame for the survey.
Sampling was conducted in two stages, each using probability (Table A1) . We had response rates over 80% in both years.
As we sampled from the Third Economic Census that was conducted in 2013, the CEES sample is representative of firms in our two sample provinces. In Table A2 , we list several attributes of manufacturing firms in the two sampled provinces for three datasets: the Third Economic Census, the 2016 Statistical Yearbook and CEES. The average number of workers per firm in CEES is 62, which is close to the average figure reported in the census. In contrast, the reported number from the 2016 statistical yearbook is much larger (an average of 307 workers per firm) because the statistical yearbook uses a sample from the Annual Survey of Industrial Firms (ASIF), which refers to firms with sales over 20 million RMB (USD 308,000) annually; as a result, it only covers 56,000 firms, which is less than 10% of all firms in the two provinces.
When we examine only firms with these levels of assets, the firms 
Data Summary
A summary of performance measures is reported in Table 1 . Based on CEES data, we find that the average annual growth rate in labor productivity (measured by sales revenue per worker) between 2013 and 2015 was 7.7%, which is lower than the 9.8% rate found using the Annual Table 1 further breaks down the firms by ownership type: that is, private firms, SOEs, HTM firms and foreign firms, where we define firm ownership based on who has a firm's final control rights. About 12% of our firms were SOEs, 62% were private firms, 18% were HTM firms and 8% were foreign firms. We find that the share of SOEs varies between our two sample provinces, as only 7% of the firms in Guangdong were SOEs, while SOEs represented 18% of firms in Hubei.
[ Table 1 Here]
Chinese SOEs are also more capital intensive (Lardy, 2014;  Naughton, 2017). Table 2 presents the average measures of capital-labor ratios across different firm types directly. For example, using fixed capital per worker as our measure of the capital-labor ratio, we find that the mean measure for SOEs is USD 37,745 per worker, which is 50% higher than those for private firms (USD 25,148 per worker), 107% higher than HTM firms (USD 18,203 per worker), and 46% higher than foreign firms (USD 25,810 per worker).
As shown in Table 2 , SOEs are also typically larger than private firms. In terms of employment, the average number of workers employed at SOEs is almost three times as large as that at private firms (920 vs. 311 workers). Although the average labor size of HTM (981 workers) and foreign firms (1,360 workers) are higher than that of SOEs, over 60% of the firms represented in our sample are private firms, which suggests that SOEs are larger than the majority of firms in China. When we evaluate firm size using sales revenue, we find that the average sales revenue of SOEs (USD 94.2 million) almost quadruples that of private firms (USD 24.4 million), 47% higher than HTM firms (USD 63.9 million), but is 34% lower than that of foreign firms (USD 141.8 million).
We also find that, in general, SOEs are older than all other types of firms in China. Specifically, SOEs are 17.3 years old, on average. In contrast, private firms, HTM firms and foreign firms are on average 9.6 years, 13.1 years and 14 years old.
Ownership and Productivity
In this section, we examine differences of efficiency (labor productivity and TFP) between SOEs and other firms using both descriptive statistics and regression analyses.
Descriptive Results
As can be seen in the descriptive statistics presented in Table 2 Similarly, Table 2 further shows that the mean TFP of SOEs is 0.55, which is considerably higher than the TFP measures of HTM firms (0.24) and private firms (-0.35), but lower than that of foreign firms (1.02).
These findings may suggest that SOEs are more productive than private firms and HTM firms. Taken together, these average measures of TFP and labor productivity suggest that SOEs outperform private and HTM firms in China.
[ Table 2 Here ]
Regressions
Consistent with descriptive analysis, our regression results presented in Table 3 show that SOEs are significantly more productive than private and HTM firms. However, different from the mixed descriptive findings, regression results show that SOEs are consistently less productive than foreign firms. As shown by column 1 in Table 3 , without controlling for fixed effects or differences in firm characteristics, the mean of labor productivity for SOEs is 56 percentage points higher than that of private firms and even higher than that of HTM firms, although it is less than foreign firms. After adding firms' age, fixed effects of industry, city and year into the estimation model (column 2), we find that the coefficient estimate on the SOEs has decreased by about 50% (from 0.557 to 0.3), while it is still significant at 1% level. These results suggests that, these factors cannot fully explain the impact of SOE ownership on labor productivity.
Results on TFP tell a similar story. When we examine measures of TFP without controlling for firm characteristics (column 3 in Zhu, 2010), which found that labor productivity and TFP (and their growth rates) were significantly lower in SOEs.
[ Table 3 Here ]
Potential Explanations for the Productivity Gap
In this section, we present three potential explanations for the gaps in productivity between SOEs and other firms. These potential explanations are human capital, market power and management.
Human Capital
The first explanation for the productivity gaps found between
SOEs and other firms is that Chinese SOEs may have higher levels of human capital. Some papers find that there is greater government ownership and control in China in more human-capital-intensive sectors (Naughton, 2017; Brandt, 2016) . This idea is supported by firm-level data extracted from the World Bank Enterprise Survey, which shows that SOEs in China have more skilled workers than private firms (Xu, 2010).
Statistical results in Table A3 find that SOEs do appear to employ workers with higher levels of human capital than other types of firms.
The fraction of workers with a high school education is 48% at SOEs, and these fractions are much lower for private firms (35%), HTM firms (27%) and foreign firms (36%). The difference between SOEs and other firms in the number of workers with at least a college education is even more dramatic; it is 16% of workers at SOEs, but is between 4% to 7% for other firms. Considering the higher human capital in SOEs, the high productivity of SOEs may be partially explained by this factor.
To examine whether human capital can explain the productivity gap, we add variables representing human capital (the proportion of workers with a high school education; 5 the proportion of workers with at least a college education) into the regression model and observe how the coefficients estimating the impact of SOE ownership on firm-level efficiency (labor productivity and TFP) change. The results in columns 1 and 5 of Table 4 show that, when we introduce these two variables into the econometric equations examining labor productivity and TFP, the coefficients on the human capital variable are robust and significantly 5 These include both academic and vocational high schools.
positive at the 5% level. Furthermore, compared to the results that do not take human capital into consideration (columns 2 and 4 in Table 3 ), the coefficient of SOEs on labor productivity has decreased by about 37%
(from 0.3 to 0.19) and that on TFP has decreased by 18% (from 0.062 to 0.051). These regression results show that, although measures of human capital can effectively and partially explain why SOEs are more productive than private firms, the efficiency gap between Chinese SOEs and private firms are still left some unexplained.
Market Power
The second potential explanation for the productivity gap between better as a result of the higher prices they can charge due to greater market power.
Summary statistics in Table A3 show that SOEs are less likely to export but they have higher market power (domestically). Specifically, 33% of SOEs export, which is slightly higher than private firms (28%) but drastically lower than HTM firms (80%) and foreign firms (83%).
Furthermore, 58% at SOEs has a market share over 10%, which is higher than all other firms (private, 46%; HTM, 46%; foreign, 49%). These mean that, SOEs are less likely to compete in the international market but have stronger market power domestically.
To examine whether market power can explain the productivity gap, we add the variables representing international competition and domestic market power, an export dummy and the domestic market share, into the regression model. Results in columns 2 and 6 of Table 4 find that, when introducing these variables representing market power into econometric equation, the coefficient estimate of the impact of SOE ownership on labor productivity has decreased by 7% (from 0.3 to 0.28) and that on TFP has decreased by 5% (from 0.062 to 0.059). Both coefficients on the SOE dummy remain statistically significant at the 1% level. In summary, these regression results show that, although measures of market power can effectively and partially explain why SOEs' productivity is higher on average than private firms, the gap between SOEs and private firms in labor productivity are still left some unexplained.
Management
Besides human capital and market power, SOEs may be more productive than other types of firms in China due to better management practices. Some papers find that, generally, the management of Chinese SOEs has improved substantially since reforms began in the late 1990s To develop our measure of firm management quality, we followed the procedure used by the World Management Survey (Bloom and Reenen, 2007) . Specifically, we calculate a management score based on the average 16 self-reported items covering topics related to targets setting, performance incentives, and performance monitoring. The total score is presented as a number ranging between 0 and 1, where a higher score represents better management practices.
The descriptive results presented in Table A3 suggest that SOEs are better managed than firms under other types of ownership in China.
Specifically, we find that the average management score at SOEs (0.621) is 12% higher than that at private firms (0.553), 13% higher than that at HTM firms (0.551) and even slightly higher than that at foreign firms (0.614).
To examine whether differences in management quality can explain the productivity gap between SOEs and other firms, we add management scores into our regression model. Results in columns 3 and 7 of Table 4 show that the coefficients of management on both labor productivity and TFP are positive and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that management matters for firm efficiency. In comparison to the regressions that do not control for management quality (columns 2 and 4 in Table 3 ), the coefficients on the SOE dummy in the labor productivity (TFP) regressions have decreased slightly, but remain significantly positive at least at the 1% level (columns 3 and 7 in Table 4 ).The results show that while more positive management practices can partially explain why SOEs are more productive than private firms in China, they still cannot fully explain the productivity gap.
Finally, in columns 4 and 8 in Table 4 , we add all three factors, human capital, market power and management, into econometric equation.
Compared to estimates in Table 3 (columns 2 and 4), the coefficient estimates of SOE dummy on labor productivity and TFP have decreased by 44% (from 0.3 to 0.169) and 29% (from 0.062 to 0.044) respectively.
These mean that, although these factors can effectively and partially explain the high productivity of SOEs in China, there is some still left unexplained. Also interestingly, the coefficients on the SOE dummy in columns 4 and 8 are close to those in columns 1 and 5, suggesting that human capital, among the three factors, is the most important one in explaining part of the productivity gap between SOEs and other firms.
[ Table 4 Here ]
Financial Returns
Although we find that SOEs perform comparably better in measures of firm efficiency, the financial returns of SOEs are lower than all other firms. The results presented in Table A3 show that the mean ROA of SOEs is 3.6%, lower than that of private firms (5.5%), HTM firms (4.2%) and foreign firms (7.3%). The pattern for ROE is the same.
These findings of the relative lower financial performance of SOEs are very similar to those found by Hsieh and Song (2015) . Specifically, these authors found that a capital productivity gap exists between state-owned firms and other types of firms, although the gap began to close between 1998 and 2011.
Regression results reported in Tables 5 and 6 confirm that SOEs are less profitable than other firms. For example, in the first column of Table 5 , we estimate differences in ROA between SOEs and other firms without controlling for any firm characteristics. Similar to descriptive statistics shown in Table A3 , we find that the ROA of Chinese SOEs is significantly lower than private, HTM and foreign firms. The coefficients on most ownership dummies are significant at 5% level, except foreign firms (column 1 in Table 5 ). ROA is the highest for foreign firms, followed by private and HTM firms. In columns 2-5, when we add other control variables sequentially, the profitability gap between SOEs and Non SOEs remain large and significant. Finally, Table 6 show that the results for ROE are similar.
[ Table 5 and 6 Here ]
Conclusions
Drawing on the China Employer-Employee Survey (CEES), a new data we collected ourselves, our paper examines differences in productivity and financial returns between SOEs and other firms under different ownership types. In comparison with existing dataset such as Annual Survey of Industrial Firms (ASIF) conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), CEES has several advantages. First, with probability proportionate-to-size (PPS) sampling method, CEES creates a sample that is more representative of China's manufacturing sector.
Second, this survey collected information of both financial performance and firm behaviors, such as human capital, market power and management quality, which contributes us to further explain differences of performance between SOEs and private firms. Third, different from ASIF that most papers used, CEES collected data at the employee-level in addition to the firm-level.
Based on the new CEES dataset, our paper provides a complete analysis of the differences in productivity and financial returns of SOEs and other firms in China. On one hand, we find that Chinese SOEs have higher labor productivity and TFP, which is 30 and 6.2 percentage points higher than private firms with benchmark regressions. On the other hand, we find that, better human capital, more market power and better management can explain partially (44 and 29 percent respectively) why labor productivity and TFP in SOEs are higher, in which human capital is the most important one explaining the productivity gap. However, there remains a large share of the SOE advantage in productivity that is left unexplained. In stark contrast, we find that financial returns measured in ROA and ROE are significantly lower for SOEs than private firms.
There are still some puzzles left that need future research. On one hand, measures representing human capital, market power and management may not sufficient account for differences of productivity and financial returns between SOEs and private firms. On the other hand, the dummies representing ownership types (SOE, private, HTM and foreign-invested firms) are cross-sectional, which make it difficult to find a perfect control group decreasing selectivity bias. Besides that, as low-efficient SOEs have stronger barriers to exit, the high productivity and low financial returns in SOEs may be under-estimated.
The policy implications of this paper are clear. On one hand, the finding of high productivity in SOEs suggests that private firms may become "worse" in recent years. Although most papers using ASIF data found that productivity (and its growth) had been significantly higher for private firms in the first three decades of China's economic reform since
1978 (e.g Brandt and Zhu, 2010), the findings of our paper suggest that, productivity growth of Chinese private firms may become slower in the recent decade, which may have negative impacts for sustainable economic development. Hence, government should make more policies to stimulate productivity growth of private firms.
On the other hand, credit constraint may be an important reason on private firms' disadvantage in productivity. In China, most banks and other financial institutions are controlled by government, which are inclined to provide more credit benefits to SOEs rather than private firms.
Therefore, in comparison with SOEs, private firms have less financial resources to introduce advanced machinery (such as computer numerical controlled machine and industrial robot), which make them less productive than SOEs. In contrast, although SOEs can have higher productivity through financial supports of government, they are induced to over-invest under the soft budget constraint, making returns to investment significantly lower. Notes: statistical analyses are based on the "China Employer-Employee Survey" (CEES) data. The numbers in brackets are standard deviations. For labor productivity, it is measured as sales revenue (thousand USD) per worker. For TFP, it is measured as residuals subtracting labor, capital from value-added, when controlling firm fixed-effects. For measures of financial return such as ROA and ROE, they are reported about percentages. SOEs are defined as state-owned enterprises. HTM firms are defined as Hong Kong/Taiwan/Macao invested firms. Notes: statistical analyses are based on the "China Employer-Employee Survey" (CEES) data. The numbers in brackets are standard deviations. SOEs are defined as state-owned enterprises, and HTM firms are defined as Hong Kong/Taiwan/Macao invested firms. For labor productivity, it is measured as sales revenue per worker. For TFP, it is measured as residuals subtracting labor and capital from value-added, when controlling firm fixed-effects. For capital labor ratio, it is measured as fixed capital per worker and total assets per worker respectively. Table 3 Productivity differences between SOEs and Non SOEs Labor productivity (in logs) TFP (in logs) Notes: the numbers in brackets are robust standard errors. *, ** and *** represent the significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. HTM firms are defined as Hong Kong/Taiwan/Macao invested firms. SOEs are defined as state-owned enterprises. Table 4 Potential explanations about productivity differences between SOEs and Non SOEs
Labor Productivity (in logs) TFP (in logs) Notes: the numbers in brackets are robust standard errors. *, ** and *** represent the significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. HTM firms are defined as Hong Kong/Taiwan/Macao invested firms. SOEs are defined as state-owned enterprises. Notes: the numbers in brackets are robust standard errors. *, ** and *** represent the significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. HTM firms are defined as Hong Kong/Taiwan/Macao invested firms. SOEs are defined as state-owned enterprises. 
A.2 Stratified Sampling
Lists of firms from the third National Economic Census, which was conducted in early 2014, were used as the sampling frame for the survey.
Sampling was conducted in two stages, each using probability Employees were also randomly selected with stratification. To do so, we first asked firms to provide a list of all employees enrolled at the end of the previous year, with middle and senior managers listed separately. We then randomly selected 10 employees in each firm (6-9 for smaller firms), among which 3 (2 for smaller firms) were middle and senior managers. If selected employees could not participate (e.g., were not working on site during the survey period), they were replaced with the worker whose name was closest to theirs on the list of workers. This process was carried out until the targeted number of sampled employees was reached.
A.3 Response Rates and Sample Sizes
In total, we collected data from 573 firms in Guangdong in 2015 and 1,122 firms from both Guangdong and Hubei provinces in 2016 (Table A1) . We had high response rates in both years. Among the 696 firms that were eligible to be surveyed in Guangdong in 2015, the response rate for the baseline survey was 82% (573 firms). Of the firms that were surveyed in Guangdong in 2015, we were able to successfully follow up with 85% of the firms in 2016 (487 firms). 6 In addition to following up with firms in 2016, we also attempted to survey firms that were included in our original target sample, but had not participated in (Table A1) . In both provinces, about 90% of the workers who were initially sampled participated in the survey. In 2016, 53% of the workers surveyed in Guangdong in 2015
were successfully re-interviewed. This relatively low follow-up rate can be attributed to firm attrition and high worker turnover. Based on the 6 Of the 15% attrition, 10% was due to refusal and 5% was due to exit or relocation.
turnover rate in each firm, new replacement workers were added to the sample from firms that participated in the 2015 survey in Guangdong (in addition to workers from the 50 replacement firms sampled in 2016).
As we sampled from the Third Economic Census that was conducted in 2013, the CEES sample is representative of firms in our two sample provinces. In Table A2 , we list several attributes of manufacturing firms in the two sampled provinces for three datasets: the Third ASIF refers to firms with sales over 20 million RMB (USD 308,000) annually and, as a result, only covers 56,000 firms, which is less than 10% of all firms in the two provinces. When we examine only firms with these levels of assets, the firms represented in CEES still better resemble those represented in the census more than the ASIF represented in the statistical yearbook. Finally, for sectoral distributions, we find that CEES resembles the firms represented in the census closely.
A.4 Questionnaire Design
The firm and worker questionnaires were designed by the four PIs together with a team of over 30 researchers. The 2016 firm questionnaire includes seven modules and 1,030 variables, covering the basic situation of firms (including firm accounting data), firm head characteristics, management, production, sales, innovation, quality control and human resources. The employee questionnaire includes five modules and 443
variables, covering personal background, current job, work history, social insurance and personality traits.
In 2016, CEES questionnaires also included a management module that was designed for the World Management Survey, which was originally designed by Nicholas Bloom and Van Reenen. An innovation of the CEES is that it is the first survey to ask both CEOs and employees questions about management practices in their firms. Notes: statistical analyses are based on the "China Employer-Employee Survey" (CEES) data. The numbers in brackets are standard deviations. SOEs are defined as state-owned enterprises, and HTM firms are defined as Hong Kong/Taiwan/Macao invested firms. For measures of financial return such as ROA and ROE, they are reported about percentages.
